In 1997, two new schemes for authenticated encryption, called signcryption, have been proposed by Zheng. In this paper we point out a serious problem with these schemes. In fact, the way to gain nonrepudiation violates the confidentiality. Moreover, we compare the schemes to previously known authenticated encryption schemes, which were not mentioned by Zheng. Finally we outline a solution that overcomes the weakness.
Introduction
Authenticated encryption schemes should provide authenticity and confidentiality of sent messages. One way to implement such schemes is first to sign a message and then to encrypt it, called the first-sign-thenencrypt paradigm, the other is vice versa, called the first-encrypt-then-sign paradigm. Instances to both paradigms have been explicitly proposed [8, 9, 10] , while [5] can be regarded as a mixture of both paradigms. The advantage of these approaches is that also nonrepudiation can be gained, as only the correct decryption must be proved. However, it must be taken care that the separation of the signature and the ciphertext is avoided.
Other schemes, which we call combined schemes in the following, try to reduce the amount of computation by gaining authenticity and confidentiality together [3, 4, 6] . However, these schemes do not gain nonrepudiation as pointed out in [9] . In practice, they are used to establish a session key and to authenticate a message, while the message is encrypted using the session key in a symmetric encryption scheme.
Recently, new combined schemes were proposed by Zheng [12] , called signcryption schemes. It was claimed that authenticity, confidentiality and nonrepudiation was gained and the efficiency is superior to all schemes based on the paradigms mentioned above. In contrast to other combined schemes, the use of a symmetric cipher is included in the description explicitly.
In this paper, we describe the model, review Zheng's schemes and point out, why the confidentiality is lost under certain circumstances. As previous combined schemes are not mentioned in [12] we compare them and show their similarities. Finally, we outline how to overcome the weakness.
2.
Model An authenticated encryption scheme provides the following procedures:
• (probabilistic) set-up algorithm SU, that outputs the system parameters P used by all participants.
• (probabilistic) key generation algorithm KG which, on input the system parameters, returns a key pair (x, y) for a user.
• (probabilistic) signature and encryption algorithm SE(m, x S , y R ) which, on input the secret key x S of the sender S, the public key y B of the receiver R and a message m, returns an authenticated ciphertext c with respect to m.
• decryption and verification algorithm DV(c, y S , x R )
which on input x R of the receiver, and the public inputs c and y S outputs an 'alleged' message m', and convinces the receiver that m' is authenticated by the sender S and, if that is true, m = m'.
• nonrepudiation protocol NR(m, c, y S , y R , x R ) which on secret input x R of the receiver R, and on public inputs m, c, y S , and y R convinces a judge that m is the correctly decrypted message with respect to c, which is authenticated by the sender S. To obtain a secure authenticated encryption scheme the following requirements must hold:
• Authenticity: There is no efficient algorithm that on input m, x R , y S and further public information returns a ciphertext c on an arbitrary message m with non-negligible probability, such that c is a ciphertext related to message m with respect to sender S and receiver R and m is authenticated by S.
• Confidentiality: There exists no efficient algorithm which, on input of the ciphertext c, the public keys y S , y R and further public information can decrypt the related cleartext m with non-negligible probability. Additional public information is all information that is obtained by an attacker during previous protocol runs with different input parameters. Note, that the attacker is allowed to corrupt the receiver in order to destroy authenticity and the judge in order to destroy confidentiality for a message that is under dispute.
3.
Review We review the first system for authenticated encryption, called SCS1 [12] 
4.
Cryptanalysis As mentioned in [12] Therefore, the judge can decrypt any further message after he was once convinced by Bob of the authenticity of a message sent by Alice. In other words, in order to gain nonrepudiation confidentiality is lost.
5.
Previously known combined schemes Several schemes for authenticated encryption are known, but not mentioned in [12] 1 . We describe one scheme from the family of schemes proposed in section 7.1 of [4] , and compare it to Zheng's scheme. It is obtained by substituting the general variables in [4] suitably (i.e. A := rs, B := -r, C := 1) and resembles in many points to the SCS1 scheme reviewed above. In order to simplify the comparison with SCS1 we add the encryption of the message with a symmetric cipher into the scheme, where E(K,m) denotes the encryption of m and D(K,c) denotes the decryption of c with respect to key K and D (K,E(K,m) )=m holds.
The initialization and key generation are the same as described above. To send a message m, sender Alice picks random k ∈ Z q *, K ∈ Z p * and computes e := h ( [4] . This reduces the communication overhead to 2 |q| bit. Another variant that leads to the same result was suggested in [6] . Compared to |q| + |d(K 2 , m)| bit communication overhead in SCS1 and using the parameter sizes suggested in [12] (|q|=160 bit and |d(K 2 , m)|=80 bit), this leads to a difference of 10 byte (independent of the size of |p|) which is clearly negligible if m is large. The computational costs for the sender and the receiver is the same in both approaches. Hence we can conclude that Zheng's scheme offers no advantages compared to previous solutions.
6.
Conclusion Let us conclude with an outline how to gain nonrepudiation without loosing confidentiality. One simple approach is to prove the correct use of x B in the decryption with a general zero-knowledge proof based on circuits without revealing e [7] . Another suggestion is that the judge is somehow trusted and therefore the attack does not work in that model. However, in both cases the benefits of the combined schemes over schemes based on the other paradigms are definitely lost. The first countermeasure is extremely inefficient and thus unacceptable even if we take into consideration that the dispute case happens quite rarely. The second countermeasure is unrealistic as well, as such a strong assumption is not necessary using the schemes on the first-sign-thenencrypt paradigm.
To overcome the problems in the SCS1 scheme we suggest an alternative approach: Let G be a finite group of order p and g be a generator of G of order p. We suggest to use h(x) := g x ∈ G to compute K 1 ||K 2 , while the algorithms remain the same except for the nonrepudiation protocol. This works as follows: Given a signature (c, r, s), Bob computes and reveals K=K 1 ||K 2 as described above. In order to show that he computed K correctly he additionally gives a proof that log z (log g (K))=log α (y B ) (mod q) with z:=y A s ·α r·s (mod p) using a protocol in [11] . The other checks described above can be performed by the judge using this K.
Clearly, the price paid for the reasonable efficient nonrepudiation protocol is that the computational costs for signing/encrypting and verifying/decryption increases, as an additional exponentiation in G is needed to compute g x . Similarly, nonrepudiation can be added to the many other variants described in [4, 6] .
